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Philosophy	  of	  mind	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  was	  dominated	  by	  vari-­‐
ous	  forms	  of	  reductionism	  and	  cognitivism.	  Despite	  many	  differences	  they	  shared	  
a	  basically	  essentialist	  outlook,	  holding	  (mostly	  implicitly)	  that	  mental	  states,	  pro-­‐
cesses,	  properties,	  and	  competencies	  are	  properly	  analysed	  as	  natural	  kinds.	  In	  
keeping	  with	  this	  basic	  presumption,	  philosophers	  and	  cognitive	  scientists	  tended	  
to	  dismiss	  historical	  and	  cultural	  considerations	  for	  purposes	  of	  understanding	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  human	  mind.	  	  
	  
Among	  the	  factors	  that	  contributed	  to	  this	  ahistorical	  bias,	  three	  are	  particularly	  
noteworthy.	  First,	  the	  primary	  concern	  of	  analytical	  philosophy	  was	  conceptual	  
analysis.	  In	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind	  this	  took	  the	  form	  of	  analyzing	  the	  conceptual	  
apparatus	  of	  folk	  psychology,	  trying	  to	  establish	  necessary	  connections	  between	  
folk	  concepts	  and	  their	  cognitive	  and	  neural	  conditions	  of	  use.	  The	  logical	  nature	  
of	  this	  approach	  made	  it	  non-­‐historical	  in	  principle.	  
	  
Secondly,	  both	  cognitivism	  and	  reductionism	  endorsed	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  human	  
mind	  supervenes	  on	  the	  biological	  brain,	  which	  was	  presumed	  to	  be	  responsive	  
only	  to	  pressures	  on	  vast,	  evolutionary	  timescales.	  Brain	  architecture	  must	  have	  
been	  substantially	  the	  same	  throughout	  most	  of	  human	  history.	  Hence,	  the	  nature	  
of	  mental	  states,	  processes,	  properties,	  and	  competencies	  must	  have	  remained	  the	  
same	  as	  well.	  
	  
Finally,	  moral	  considerations	  made	  it	  hard	  to	  think	  otherwise.	  According	  to	  a	  
long-­‐standing	  Western	  tradition,	  the	  mind	  is	  the	  seat	  of	  human	  dignity	  and	  man’s	  
defining	  characteristic.	  From	  that	  perspective,	  changes	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  conscious	  
minds	  on	  anything	  short	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  timescale	  would	  seem	  to	  compromise	  
the	  moral	  unity	  of	  mankind.	  Even	  if	  animals	  and	  early	  hominids	  can	  be	  excluded	  
from	  our	  peer	  group	  (to	  which	  some	  would	  strongly	  object),	  drawing	  the	  line	  any	  
closer	  to	  home	  is	  insufferable.	  
	  
Looking	  back	  on	  the	  intellectual	  landscape	  of	  the	  1970s,	  80s	  and	  90s,	  it	  makes	  
perfect	  sense	  that	  Julian	  Jaynes	  was	  considered	  a	  maverick.	  There	  was	  simply	  no	  
place	  for	  his	  historical	  approach	  to	  consciousness	  (Jaynes	  1976).	  His	  theory	  was	  
rejected	  on	  apriori	  grounds	  as	  conceptually	  incoherent,	  biologically	  impossible,	  
and	  probably	  also	  morally	  suspect	  (cf.	  Sleutels	  2006).	  
	  
Today	  the	  situation	  is	  quite	  different,	  however.	  In	  the	  late	  1990s	  the	  landscape	  
started	  to	  shift	  towards	  a	  view	  of	  the	  mind	  as	  being	  contingent	  upon	  a	  variety	  of	  
external	  factors.	  The	  so-­‐called	  EEE	  approach	  (Embodied,	  Embedded,	  Enacted	  
Cognition)	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  ecological	  and	  cultural	  context	  of	  psychological	  
competencies,	  while	  varieties	  of	  the	  Extended	  Mind	  hypothesis	  pointed	  up	  the	  
importance	  of	  external	  tools	  (including	  language	  technologies)	  for	  the	  develop-­‐
ment	  of	  cognitive	  skills	  (Clark	  2008).	  Critics	  of	  evolutionary	  psychology	  are	  ques-­‐
tioning	  the	  presumption	  of	  psychological	  continuity	  that	  goes	  with	  essentialism	  
(Sleutels	  2013),	  while	  philosophers	  such	  as	  Hutto	  (2008)	  argue	  that	  our	  current	  
self-­‐understanding	  as	  thinking,	  conscious	  agents	  (our	  ‘folk	  psychology’)	  is	  contin-­‐
gent	  on	  socio-­‐cultural	  practices.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  situate	  Jaynes’s	  view	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  modern	  consciousness	  in	  
the	  newly	  emerged	  landscape.	  I	  review	  some	  of	  the	  most	  pertinent	  developments	  
in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mind,	  including	  work	  in	  cognitive	  archaeology	  (Malafouris	  
2008)	  and	  so-­‐called	  ‘radically	  enactivist’	  theories	  of	  mind	  (Hutto	  and	  Myin	  2013).	  
I	  conclude	  by	  proposing	  a	  general	  argument	  for	  the	  contingency	  of	  mind	  that	  un-­‐
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